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INTRODUCTION 
The recognition of corruption as a problem affecting both the 
governance and development of countries around the world has come 
of age.  “Low administrative efficiency, poor governance structure, 
political instability, and [the] underdevelopment of [a national] 
economy” are the primary causes of corruption.
1
  The World Bank 
maintains that corruption is “the single greatest obstacle to economic 
and social development.”
2
  It also estimates that over one trillion U.S. 
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1  Kilkon Ko & Ananya Samajdar, Evaluation of International Corruption 
Indexes: Should We Believe Them or Not?, 47 SOC. SCI. J. 508, 508-509 (2010). 
2 Axel Dreher et al., Corruption Around the World: Evidence from a 
Structural Model, 35 J. Comp. Econ. 443, 444 (2007) (citing World Bank, 
www.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/index.ctm; see, e.g., Best Practice 
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dollars are paid in bribes annually throughout the world.
3
  Recently, 
corruption has been the subject of numerous academic writings as well 
as the focus of several organizations that have made combating 
corruption one of their top priorities.
4
  As international relations and 
cross-national business dealings grow, corruption has become an 




Issues involving corruption are major hurdles affecting the 
continued development of many countries.
6
 
In less than a half-decade, the worldwide backlash 
against corruption has swept like a firestorm across 
the global political landscapes. Governments have 
fallen.  Longtime ruling parties have been hounded 
out of office.  Presidents, prime ministers, 
parliamentarians, and once mighty corporate 
chieftains have been grilled by prosecutors and 
herded in the docket.  Italy, France, Japan, South 
Korea, India, Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, Israel:  no 
region and hardly any country has been immune.
7
 
Due to the increasing interest in corruption over the years, social 
scientists have created a number of methods to measure corruption and 
the impact that it has on society in order to assist in corruption 
prevention.
8
  One of the growing trends in examining corruption is 
through the use of mathematical and scientific models.  Models are one 
of the principal instruments of modern science and engineering used to 
                                                                                                 
in Anti-Corruption Strategies for Development Programme, TRANSPARENCY 
INTERNATIONAL, 
http://www.transparency.org/global_priorities/poverty/corruption_aid/best_prac
tice (last visited Jan. 28, 2012))).  
3 Id.  
4 Arvind K. Jain, Corruption: A Review, 15 J.ECON. SURV. 71, 71 (2001).  
5 Ko & Samajdar, supra note 1, at 509.  
6 Benjamin A. Olken, Corruption Perceptions vs. Corruption Reality, 93 J. 
PUB. ECON. 950, 950 (2009). See also William Q. Judge et al., The Antecedents 
and Effects of National Corruption: A Meta-Analysis, 46 J. WORLD BUS. 93, 93 
(2011) (“[E]vidence suggests that corruption is the central economic issue 
facing Turkey, Russia, the African continent, China, Indonesia, and Poland.” 
(citations omitted)).  
7 Judge, supra note 6 at 93 (citing H. Wang & J. Rosenau, Transparency 
International and Corruption as an Issue of Global Governance, 7 GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE 25, 26 (2001)).  
8 Id. 
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give a simplified picture of a part of the real world.
9
   “A model is any 
simplification, substitute or stand-in for what you are actually studying 
or trying to predict.”
10
  Corruption models are used to understand the 
prevalence of corruption and the causes and effects of corruption for 
the purpose of reducing corruption.
11
   Corruption is primarily a social 
issue, and therefore, corruption models are classified as social science 
models.  The social scientists that use corruption models have the lofty 
objective of building “robust [and] durable theoretical frameworks to 




Over the past ten years scholars have published an increasing 
amount of literature introducing and discussing the use of corruption 
models to address social issues.  Models can and should inform policy-
makers and legislators as to the sources of corruption, effects of 
corruption, and possible results of implementing anti-corruption 
policies in the country.  If implemented, many of these models could 
change the laws of countries with corruption and ultimately have some 
impact on the citizens of these countries.  Traditional legal 
professionals—who often do not have a background in applied 
mathematics, statistical analysis, or empirical methods of data 
collection—have been skeptical of the growing trend of analyzing legal 
issues using social science models.
13
  Many legal professionals do not 
believe that enough of a consensus exists between social theories to 
warrant such models useful.
14
  Social scientists on the other hand, 
believe the legal system is under-using, or altogether ignoring valid 
theories, research, and models.
15
  Thus, while models have further 
improved the understanding of the causes and effects of corruption, the 
                                                 
9 See generally CHARLES A. LAVE & JAMES G. MARCH, AN INTRODUCTION 
TO MODELS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 3 (1975) (exploring what a model is and 
how a hypothetical model might or might not be helpful to a certain end).  
10 CRAIG M. PEASE & JAMES J. BULL, SCIENTIFIC DECISION-MAKING ch. 4 
para. 1 (2000), http://www.utexas.edu/courses/bio301d/Topics/Models/Text. 
html.   
11 Jain, supra note 4 at 85.  
12 J. B. Ruhl, Law’s Complexity: A Primer, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 885, 909 
(2008). See generally J. B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory 
to Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and Its Practical Meaning for 
Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1407 (1996) (noting relevance and use of 
models in understanding and shaping legal systems).   
13 Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and Social Science in the Twenty-First 
Century, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 2 (2002).  
14 Id. at 4.  
15 Id.  
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actual use of models to help combat corruption has been relatively 
minimal.  
The overall purpose of this article is to give an overview of what 
corruption models are and the impact that they could possibly have in 
helping to shape laws meant to prevent and curb corruption.  This 
article has four goals: provide a general understanding of corruption 
and its impact; describe the use of models to understand corruption; 
analyze the possible impact that models can have on public policy and 
law; and analyze the possible limitations that lawmakers might face 
with models.  Section I of this article provides a general overview of 
corruption, its effects, and the most popular method currently used to 
measure corruption: the corruption indices used by Transparency 
International and the World Bank. Section II introduces models, the 
rationale for models, and the possible effects on a country that 
corruption models can have if properly utilized by governments. 
Section III takes a critical view of models and whether they can be 
properly used to address the complex issue of corruption. Lastly, 
Section IV studies the issue of legal acceptance of models. 
 
I. CORRUPTION AND TRADITIONAL CORRUPTION 
MEASUREMENTS 
A. AN OVERVIEW OF CORRUPTION 
There are many definitions of corruption,
16
 but one of the most 
commonly accepted definitions is “the misuse of entrusted power for 
private gain.”
17
  This definition applies to both financial and non-
financial gains received as a result of corrupt acts.
18
  Private gain at the 
expense of the public indicates an “absence of equal and fair treatment 
for all [persons] on the part of public officials.”
19
  The underlying 
assumption is that government officials will treat all persons equally 
and fairly, with such equal and fair representation permeating all 
official acts and decisions; however, the misuse of power violates the 
assumption.    The absence of equal and fair treatment is in direct 
conflict with the “arm’s length principle” that is traditionally applied in 
                                                 
16 See Ko & Samajdar, supra note 1, app. 2.  
17 TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2007 xxi 
(Diana Rodriguez & Linda Ehrichs eds., 2007).  
18 Id. 
19 VITO TANZI, CORRUPTION AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 4 (Sarah Broberg & 
Yasser Selim eds., 2006).  
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  Under the arm’s length principle, “no personal 
or family relationship should play any role in economic decision-
making, be it by private economic agents or by government officials.”
21
  
Once any weight is given to any non-professional relationship, the 
arm’s length principle is violated.
22
 
Within the broad definition of corruption, the manifestations of 
corruption fall into different levels and categories.
23
  Generally, social 
scientists classify corruption as grand corruption or petty corruption.
24
  
These classifications are based on the frequency, prevalence, and 
spread of corruption throughout the many layers of government.  Grand 
corruption involves the acts of high-level government officials who 
have the power to make economic policies.
25
 Typically, grand 
corruption occurs when an official implements or changes government 
policies for selfish interest and ultimately impacts the general 
populace.
26
  At this level, if money is involved, it is typically a 
substantial amount of money.
27
  Grand corruption typically involves 
corruption by presidents, governors, senators, and heads of state 
departments.  Petty corruption, on the other hand, is generally 
considered the everyday, street-level, corruption that citizens encounter 
and usually involves only small sums of money and low-level 
officials.
28
  Government officials commit petty corruption, for example, 
when they accept offers from citizens in the forms of payments or 
favors to avoid having to comply with government laws or to speed the 
fulfillment of government requirements.
29
  Petty corruption usually 
involves people who have daily contact with citizens, such as police 
                                                 
20 Id.  
21 DANIELA ZEMANOVICOVA ET AL., OBSTACLES TO OPEN AND HONEST 
GOVERNMENT: AN OVERVIEW OF CORRUPTION: CORRUPTION AS A PROBLEM 
(ETHICAL, MORAL, ECONOMIC, POLITICAL) AFFECTING THE WHOLE SOCIETY 1 
(2002).  
22 TANZI, supra note 19, at 4.  
23 See MELISSA A. THOMAS & PATRICK MEAGHER, THE IRIS DISCUSSION 
PAPERS ON INST. & DEV. PAPER NO. 04/03,A CORRUPTION PRIMER: AN 
OVERVIEW OF CONCEPTS IN THE CORRUPTION LITERATURE,  Box 2 at 3 (2004).  
24 Id. at 17. 
25 Jain, supra note 4, at 73. 
26 Id. at 73-74. 
27
 THE WORLD BANK, Module III Introduction to Corruption, in YOUTH 
FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE: DISTANCE LEARNING PROGRAM 1, 7. 
28 Id.  
29 GEORGE R. G. CLARKE, THE WORLD BANK, HOW PETTY IS PETTY 
CORRUPTION? EVIDENCE FROM FIRM SURVEY IN AFRICA 2 (2008) available at 
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15073/1/MPRA_paper_15073.pdf. 
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officers and immigration officials.
30
  The degree of corruption varies 
from country to country and within any given country.  Although a 
country may have a high concentration of one type of corruption, such 
corruption does not necessarily indicate that the other type of 
corruption will be equally high.
31
  
Corruption in the government generally affects the citizens of 
the country by increasing the transaction costs of performing 
business.
32
  The increase in transaction costs associated with corrupt 
governments leads to a decrease in the amount of government funding 
and reduces the amount of goods that citizens in the country ultimately 
receive.
33
  Thus, when high levels of corruption affect citizens’ day-to-
day living, citizens often lose confidence in their government.
34
  
Moreover, as citizen and country morale decline, the level of crimes 
committed within a country typically increases.
35
 
The World Bank estimates that governments which address 
corruption and corruption-related conduct occurring in the system 
could “increase per capita incomes by a staggering 400 percent.”
36
  
Recognizing the problems caused by corruption, international 
organizations and individual countries have launched anti-corruption 
policies.
37
  For example, after the conviction of 106,000 corrupt 
government officials in 2009, the Chinese government issued a new 
corruption code in February 2010.
38
  China has made its anti-corruption 
policy a top priority, evidencing the Chinese government’s belief that if 
corruption is left unchecked, it could threaten the established rule of 
law in the country.
39
  In fact, China takes corruption so seriously that a 
                                                 
30 George Moody-Stuart, The Costs of Grand Corruption, ECONOMIC 
REFORM TODAY, NUMBER FOUR, 1996, at 19,  available at www.cipe.org/ 
publications/ert/e22/E22_05.pdf. 
31 Module III, supra note 27, at 7. (“For example, there may be very little 
grand corruption in a country with a relatively clean elite, but a large amount of 
petty corruption in the lower offices of government.”).  
32 ZEMANOVICOVA, supra note 21, at 3. 
33 Id.   
34 Dimitri Vlassis, The United Nations Convention against Corruption, in 
BUSINESS AGAINST CORRUPTION: CASE STORIES & EXAMPLES 11 (Birgit Errath 
of the U.N. Global Compact Office, 2006).  
35 ZEMANOVICOVA, supra note 21, at 4.  
36 Dreher, supra note 2, at 444; [what is the world bank site?] 
37 TANZI, supra note 19, at 22.  
38 Calum MacLeod, China Wages War on Pervasive Corruption, USA 
TODAY, March 3, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2010-03-09-
China-corruption_N.htm. 
39 Id. 
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public official can receive the death penalty if he or she is found guilty 
of a corruption crime.
40
  Compared to most other countries, China’s 
anti-corruption policy and harsh penalties for violation may be 
considered an extreme form of anti-corruption deterrence.  
The United Nations introduced the U.N. Convention Against 
Corruption, also known as the 10
th
 Principle, in 2005 in an attempt to 
assist countries in developing anti-corruption policies of their own.
41
  
The Convention offers a comprehensive set of standards, measures, and 
rules to strengthen a country’s legal and regulatory regimes to combat 
corruption.
42
  Thus far, over one hundred thirty countries have pledged 
to implement and integrate the 10
th




Initially, researchers attempted to determine the amount of 
corruption in a country from the number of corruption-based arrests 
and convictions.
44
  The problem with such a measurement is that each 
country places differing degrees of emphasis on anti-corruption.  For 
instance, in a country with high amounts corruption but little 
enforcement, the level of reported corruption is relatively lower than in 
a country which places a high emphasis on anti-corruption.
45
  
Researchers have abandoned the corruption-based arrest and conviction 
method and have since implemented the perception-based corruption 
indices to measure corruption.
46
 
B.  CORRUPTION MEASUREMENT INDICES 
In addition to the anti-corruption laws implemented by various 
governments, additional efforts to combat corruption have arisen over 
the years from non-government entities.  For example, both 
Transparency International and the World Bank have developed 
corruption measurement indices.
47
  Transparency International’s 
                                                 
40 See China to Keep Death Penalty for Corruption Crimes, CHINA DAILY, 
September 29, 2010, www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-09/29/content_11361 
507.htm. 
41 Vlassis, supra note 34, at 7. 
42 Id.  
43 Id. at 12. 
44 Mitchell A. Seligson, The Measurement and Impact of Corruption 
Victimization: Survey Evidence from Latin America, 34 WORLD DEV. No. 2, 
381, 383 (2006). 
45 Id. at 383-84. 
46 Id. at 384.  
47 Judge, supra note 6, at 95 (“[Transparency International] is a Berlin-
based international non-governmental organization established in May 1993 
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Corruption Perception Index [hereafter CPI] and the World Bank 
Control of Corruption Index [hereinafter WBCCI], both released 
annually, are the two most recognized corruption indices in corruption 
research.
48
  These corruption indices attempt to “qualitatively 
[measure] the pervasiveness of corruption in a country.”
49
  The CPI 
results are based on corruption survey questions filled out by “multiple 
business executives, financial journalists, and country experts.”
50
  The 
WBCCI is based on corruption indicators including “(1) frequency of 
additional payments required to get things done, (2) effects of 
corruption on the general business environment, and (3) the tendency of 
elites to control the state” as assessed by “international organizations, 
political and business risk rating agencies, international think tanks, and 
relevant non-governmental organizations.”
51
  Both the CPI and WBCCI 
are popular among anti-corruption advocates and are frequently cited in 
scholarly books, journals, and articles.
52
  
Because these indices are mainly based on survey questions, the 
CPI and WBCCI are deemed perception-based corruption indices.
53
  
Although the World Bank
54
 and Transparency International have 
helped to further the understanding and impact of corruption with their 
corruption measurement indices,
55
 many scholars have criticized both 
the CPI and WBCCI stating that they should not be used as accurate 
measures of corruption for any particular country.
56
  The scholars who 
                                                                                                 
that has been conducting cross-national of perceived corruption since 1995. 
[Transparency International] aims to broaden awareness of the damage caused 
by corruption and to encourage governments and international organizations to 
adopt and implement anti-corruption laws and programs.”). 
48 Id.  
49 Dreher, supra note 2, at 444.  
50 Judge, supra note 6, at 95.  
51 Id.  
52 Ko & Samajdar, supra note 1, at 509.  
53 See Fredrik Galtung, Measuring the Immeasurable: Boundaries and 
Functions of (Macro) Corruption Indices, in MEASURING CORRUPTION, 101-
130, 103 (Charles Sampford et al. eds., 2006) see also Judge, supra note 6, § 
1.3.2, at 95. 
54 Judge, supra note 6, at 95 (“The World Bank views good governance 
and anti-corruption as important to its poverty alleviation mission.”). 
55 See Ko & Samajdar, supra note 1, at 510 (“Before the advent of 
[international corruption indices] research on corruption was mainly confined 
to case studies, and was characterized by imprecise operationalizations of the 
concept of corruption.” (citation omitted)).  
56 See, e.g., Galtung, supra note 53 (Fredik Galtung is a former 
Transparency International researcher. In this article he addresses several 
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criticize perception-based corruption indices claim that such indices do 
not measure actual corruption.  The critics allege that the findings and 
country rankings are instead based on the mere opinions of non-citizen 
“experts” who complete the survey questions.
57
  Without direct data to 
measure corruption, many critics have questioned how these survey 




The lack of direct data also means that the correlation between 
perceived and actual corruption may be inaccurately low or, in some 
cases, high.
59
  Some scholars believe that perception-based corruption 
indices are in fact based on underlying biases about the quality of a 
country’s institution and not actual degrees of corruption.
60
  Underlying 
biases could have unfounded, long term, and damaging effects because 
if these opinions affect the indices and as a result the indices indicate a 
country’s government is corrupt, the perception of that country may 
never change.
61
  Indices are based on perception of corruption in the 
government, and therefore, scholars believe that a negative perception 
may cause future survey respondents to over-estimate the corruption 
within a particular country.
62
  Additionally, these indices may also have 
the damaging effect of causing public officers to believe that they are 
allowed accept bribes and citizens to believe that they should pay 
bribes in order to conduct business.
63
  For these reasons, perception-
based, corruption-measurement indices arguably contribute to the 
                                                                                                 
criticisms of the CPI. He argues that the CPI should be radically revised and 
complemented by additional indicators.).  
57 See Ko & Samajdar, supra note 1, at 517-8 [What both CPI & WBCCI 
measure at 517] (“…most experts are not local residents…” 518). 
58 Olken, supra note 6, at 1. 
59 Dreher, supra note 2, at 444.  
60 Id. See also Asad Zaman & Faiz-Ur-Rahim, Corruption: Measuring the 
Unmeasurable, 25 HUMANOMICS 117, 121 (2009) (There are additional 
arguments for underlying biases among respondents of perception-based 
corruption indices. As it relates to CPI, one group of scholars argue that the 
index is biased because the survey group 1) is fairly closed; 2) “is not 
accustomed to the local customs and language (they do not know how issues 
are settled locally and tend to use bribery to solve problems fast)”; and 3) are 
businessmen.). 
61 See Dreher, supra note 2, at 444, fn. 5 (this fear is known as “artificial 
inertia”); See also Axel Dreher et al., How Do Institutions Affect Corruption 
and The Shadow Economy? (2005) available at http://business-
school.exeter.ac.uk/documents/papers/economics/2005/0505.pdf. 
62 Id. 
63 Zaman & Faiz-Ur-Rahim, supra note 60, at 122.  
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cyclical problem of government corruption.
64
   The criticisms of 
perception-based indices have largely been the cause of increases in the 
use of models and actual data to measure corruption. 
 
II.  MODELS OF CORRUPTION 
A.  AN OVERVIEW OF MODELS 
As stated above, a model is generally defined as “any 
simplification, substitution or stand-in for what [a person] is actually 
trying to study or predict.”
65
  Models use some real world 
characteristics but are largely a simplified picture of the real world.
66
  
Whereas the real world contains a variety of complexities, models are 
typically characterized as simplistic compilations of real world facts.
67
  
Creating models, or modeling, includes the following steps:  
1. Define the problem of interest; 
2. Gather relevant data based on the problem; 
3. Formulate a model to represent the problem; 
4. Develop a procedure for deriving solutions to the problem 
from the model; 
5. Test the model and refine it as needed (is the model valid; 
does it do what it is designed to do?); 
6. Implement the solution; and 
7. Prepare for the ongoing application of the model.68  
                                                 
64 Id.  
65 PEASE & BULL, supra note 10.  
66 LAVE & MARCH, supra note 9 (There are six traditional types of models: 
Physical, Scaled, Analog, Management Games, Computer Simulation, and 
Mathematical. Physical models are more exact, because they use actual people, 
while on the end mathematical models are more abstract. Corruption models, as 
computer simulation or mathematical models, typical fall on the abstract end of 
model types.) See also James E. Reeb & Scott Leavengood, An Introduction to 
Models and Probability Concepts, PERFORMANCE EXCELLENCE IN THE WOOD 
PRODUCT INDUSTRY, Or. St. Univ., Oct., 1998; Jain, supra note 5, at 85-91. 
67 Id.  
68 See Reeb & Leavengood, supra note 66, at 1; see also FREDERICK S. 
HILLIER & GERALD J. LIEBERMAN, INTRODUCTION TO OPERATIONS RESEARCH, 7 
(7th ed. 2001). 
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Although researchers have the choice to either experiment with 
the real world or with models of the situation, researchers should be 
encouraged to use models where testing assumptions and making 
predictions might not otherwise be feasible.
69
  Models have the ability 
to process a large amount of data and represent mathematically 
complex physical and social relationships, allowing researchers to test 
assumptions and make predictions in ways that may otherwise not be 
possible.
70
  Researchers may prefer to use models instead of real world 
situations to test theories when the actual situation may be too complex, 
too expensive, or too time consuming.
71
  For example, meteorologists 
build and use models to test theories on weather patterns since they 
have no control over the actual weather.
72
  Similarly, corruption models 
have the capacity to help explain events and occurrences in the world 
and may provide invaluable insights for real world situations.
73
  
Models may also be particularly useful to address social issues 
affecting a country or region.  Policy makers and social engineers are 
turning to models to study real world issues at an increasing rate.
74
  
Models created to examine and study social issues are appealing to 
policy makers and social engineers because they represent complex real 
world situations.
75
  These social science models are used to examine 
social-political issues where the fundamental underlying theory of the 
problem is either unknown or does not exist.
76
  Corruption is a socio-
political issue without any universally accepted theory, and therefore, 




                                                 
69 See Reeb & Leavengood, supra note 66, at 3.  
70 James D. Fine & Dave Owen, Technocracy and Democracy: Conflicts 
between Models and Participation in Environmental Law and Planning, 56 
HASTINGS L. J. 901, 904 (2005).  
71 See Reeb & Leavengood, supra note 66, at 2.  
72 Id. at 3. 
73 LAVE & MARCH, supra note 9, at 3.  
74 MARCUS A. LOUIE & KATHLEEN M. CARLEY, CARNEGIE MELLON 
UNIVERSITY, SCHOOL OF COMPUTER SCIENCE, THE ROLE OF DYNAMIC-NETWORK 
MULTI-AGENT MODELS OF SOCIO-POLITICAL SYSTEMS IN POLICY abstract 
(2007).  
75 Id.  
76 Id. at 3. 
77 See Judge, supra note 6, at 93 (“There is no overarching theoretical 
framework to explain corruption events…”). 
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C.  CORRUPTION MODELS
78
 
Corruption models measure the causes and effects of 
corruption in order to assist in efforts to prevent corruption.
79
  
Specifically, these models identify and analyze the relationship 
between causes and effects of corruption.
80
  Corruption models were 
first introduced in 1968 in Gary Becker’s article Crime and 
Punishment: An Economic Approach.
81
  Becker’s article examined and 
ultimately concluded that “individuals weigh[ing] the relative cost and 
benefits of illegal [corrupt] acts to make a ‘rational’ choice.  The cost 
and benefits [were] influenced by exogenous factors that include[d] the 
role of government and the socio-cultural environment.”
82
 Since then, 




                                                 
78 See generally Jain, supra note 4, at 85 (Section 4 Models of 
Corruption).  
79 Judge, supra note 6, at 93.  
80 Interview with Dr. Eliot Motato, Professor of Engineering Science, 
Pontificia Universidad Javieriana, in Santiago de Cali, Colom. (Sept. 4, 2010). 
81 RAJEEV K. GOEL & MICHAEL A. NELSON, BANK OF FIN. DISCUSSION 
PAPERS, CAUSES OF CORRUPTION: HISTORY, GEOGRAPHY, AND GOVERNMENT 9 
(2008); See also Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 
76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968).  
82 GOEL & NELSON, supra note 81, at 9.   
83 See Feisal Khan, Understanding the Spread of Systemic Corruption in 
the Third World, 6 AM. REV. POL. ECON. 16, 31 (2008); See also GOEL & 
NELSON, supra note 81; Jain, supra note 4. 
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1.  AN EXAMPLE MODEL: INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE PERSPECTIVE 
 
Figure 1: An adaptation of Michael W. Collier’s Institutional Choice 
Perspective on the causes and effects of corruption 
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Figure 1 above is adapted from Michael W. Collier’s model on 
the institutional choice perspective on corruption.
84
  This type of model 
is a computer simulation model.  In models such as these, a set of rules 
that define behavior create the agents.  In this example, the behavior is 
titled the “Agent’s Internalized Rules & Incentives.” Similar to 
Becker’s original examination, the Collier model “focuses on the 
internalized world of the agent who may or may not engage in corrupt 
behavior and the externalized world surrounding the agent which serves 
to constrain and/or legitimize corrupt behavior.  In addition, material 
resource factors influence the expected benefits of corruption.”
85
 The 
internal world makes up the agent’s decision-making process and his 
willingness to partake or not partake in corrupt actions.
86
 The external 
world makes up the rules and opportunities that influence the agent’s 
decision-making.
87
      Based on Collier’s model, researchers can adjust 
factors such as institutional antecedents of corruption, the agent’s 
expected costs and benefits, and material resource factors in order to 
determine the outputs or effects of corruption.
88
  After adjusting the 
model and collecting the information obtained from the adjustments, 




Once a cause and effect relationship has been determined 
lawmakers can use this information to determine what changes in the 
law, if any, need to take place in order to combat corruption. 
2.  REAL WORLD EXAMPLE OF THE IMPACT OF MODELS: THE 
REINIKKA AND SVENSSON BARGAINING MODEL
90
 
A noteworthy example of how researchers can use corruption 
models to solve real world problems comes from the Ugandan school 
system.  In the early 1990s, schools in Uganda were not increasing their 
primary enrollment despite an increase in public education funds.
91
  
                                                 
84 Michael W. Collier, Explaining Corruption: An Institutional Choice 
Approach, 38 CRIME, L. &SOC. CHANGE, no. 1, July 2002, at 1, 4.  
85 Judge, supra note 6, at 94.  
86 Id. at 4. 
87 Id.  
88 Motato, supra note 80.  
89 Id.  
90 Ritva Reinikka & Jakob Svensson, Explaining Leakage of Public 
Funds, 1-45 (World Bank Pol. Res., Working Paper No. 2709, Oct. 2001).  
91 Ritva Reinikka & Jakob Svensson, Survey Techniques to Measure and 
Explain Corruption, 1-21 (World Bank Pol. Res., Working Paper No. 3071, 
June 2003).  
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Adequate accounting records of actual expenditures were not available 
and so a Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS) was conducted 
over a five year period (1991-1995) in order to determine where the 
education funds were actually going.
92
  PETS also determined what 




The PETS results revealed that only thirteen percent of the 
government funds actually reached the schools from 1991 to 1995.
94
  
The other eighty-seven percent was either captured for private gain or 
used by government officials for purposes unrelated to education.
95
  In 
addition to the overall ability of schools to receive their funding, the 
PETS results also revealed large variations in leakages across the 
schools.
96
  Most schools received very little or nothing at all.
97
  The 
PETS analysis revealed significant occurrences of government 
corruption which ultimately limited the ability of children to receive a 
proper education.  
Based on the PETS results, Ritva Reinikka and Jakob Svensson 
developed a model to determine what could be done to curb the 
corruption and have the funds reach their intended destination.  The 
model determined that three variables explained the leakage across 
schools: “school size, income, and the extent to which teachers are 
unqualified.
98
  Large schools with wealthier families and with a higher 
percentage of qualified teachers received more of the intended funds 
per student than smaller schools in low income areas with under-
qualified teachers.
99
  The model determined, in pertinent part: 
[a] [one] percent increase in school size . . . reduces 
leakage by [two] percentage points. A [one] percent 
increase in household income . . . increases the 
amount of public funding that reaches the school by 
0.25 percentage points, and a similar increase in the 
                                                 
92 Id. at 3.  
93 Id. at 4. 
94 Id.  
95 Id. 
96 Id.  
97 Id. (citing Anders Jeppson, Financial Priorities Under Decentralization 
in Uganda, 16 HEALTH POL. & PLAN., no. 2, 2001 at 187-192).  
98 Id. at 39.  
99 Reinikka & Svensson, supra note 91, at 7.  
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The model also determined that schools which attempted to claim their 
funds had little bargaining power.  The lack of bargaining power 




Based on the findings of the model, the Ugandan government took 
action to even the playing field between schools receiving 
disproportionate amounts of government funding on the basis of socio-
economic factors.
102
  The government began publishing in newspapers 
and broadcasting on the radio more detailed information about the 
monthly transfers.
103
  The government also mandated that schools 
publicly post all funds received.
104
  The government’s intention in 
implementing such mandates was to empower the schools by lowering 
the cost of information and strengthening the school’s overall 
bargaining power.
105
  The Ugandan government’s actions had a 
tremendous impact:  while most schools were still not receiving all of 
their funding, the amount received by all schools went from thirteen 
percent to over eighty percent by 2001.
106
  
The most positive result of the Reinikka and Svenson Bargaining 
Model was the increase in funds received by the schools and the 
enhanced educational opportunities of the children within those 
schools.  This example demonstrates the impact that models can have 
on anti-corruption policies.  The laws shaped by corruption models and 
implemented in governments with documented corruption can 
ultimately impact the lives of citizens.  
 
III.  CRITICISMS AND LIMITATIONS OF MODELS 
Despite the growing popularity in using models to determine the 
cause and effects of corruption, governments do not universally 
embrace corruption models as a means of combating corruption. There 
are a few reasons why models have yet to be fully embraced: 1) the 
                                                 
100 Id.  
101 Reinikka & Svensson, supra note 90, at 29. 
102 Id.  
103 Reinikka & Svensson, supra note 91, at 8.  
104 Id.  
105 Reinikka & Svensson, supra note 90, at 29. 
106 Reinikka & Svensson, supra note 91, at 4. 
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belief that models cannot actually measure corruption for various 
reasons, such as human complexity and country culture; and 2) the 
issue of collecting data on corrupt acts.  
A.  CAN MODELS ACTUALLY MEASURE CORRUPTION? 
Corruption, in general, is complex.
107
  Corrupt acts are most often 
contrived and performed in secrecy, adding to the complexity of 
corruption and making it more difficult for researchers to study it.
108
  
Despite the boom in corruption models over the past decade, there is no 
overarching theoretical foundation to explain corrupt acts.
109
  This may 
be due to the belief by some scholars that overall “[c]orruption is a 
variable that cannot be measured directly.”
110
  Some scholars argue that 
the term corruption is too broad and vague, and therefore, cannot be 
measured.
111
  “Corruption” as a socio-political occurrence is perhaps 
too complex to be measured as a collective whole because there are so 




Models are simplified pictures of the real world, and therefore, 
are really just approximations and incomplete pictures of reality.
113
  
Predictions can be uncertain, especially when the outcome is based on 
human behavior.
114
  Humans encounter many small events every day 
which unpredictably affect their lives and future actions.
115
  Modelers 
try to reduce this uncertainty, but reducing it to zero is inherently 
impossible because a model cannot assess every variable that could 
possibly influence an individual’s final decision.
116
  Thus, because 
models, such as corruption models, are so complex, it is even more 
difficult to assess the certainty of their results.
117
  In addition, model 
results become even more uncertain as models try to predict outcomes 
further into the future.
118
  Models need to be continuously reevaluated 
throughout the testing process to take into account continuing 
information and diverse variables that arise in the real world.  
                                                 
107 Collier, supra note 84, at 2.  
108 Seligson, supra note 44, at 383.  
109 Judge, supra note 6, at 94.  
110 Dreher, supra note 2, at 444. 
111 Zaman & Faiz-Ur-Rahim, supra note 60, at 118.  
112 See Zaman, supra note 60.  
113 Fine & Owen, supra note 70, at 922.  
114 Id.  
115 Khan, supra note 83, at 31.  
116 Fine & Owen, supra note 70, at 922.  
117 Id. at 905. 
118 Id. at 923. 
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Scholars also argue that measurements of corruption cannot be 
applied universally because the culture within each country is 
different.
119
  Culture is “the accepted norms and practices of a 
society.”
120
  For example, in most Western countries government 
agencies conduct business at an arm’s length but in other countries, 
such as China, the practice of guanxi is considered the norm.
121
  Under 
the principle of guanxi, if one does a favor for someone else, that favor 
is expected to be repaid in the future.
122
  This practice of building long-
term business and political relationships through an exchange of favors 
is a common practice in some East-Asian cultures but frowned upon in 
many Western cultures because these favors are viewed as informal 
bribery.
123
  Thus, using a singular model to measure bribery would rank 
countries that follow the guanxi principle as more corrupt than 
countries that transact business at an arm’s length.  Any model that 
would attempt to place the same standards on each country without first 
examining a country’s culture, norms, and laws, would arguably be 
inaccurate because established norms in one country are frowned upon 
in others.  
Anyone attempting to measure corruption must specifically target 
one type of corruption in their study.
124
  Corruption as an overarching 
concept is too vague to have a single model attempt to measure every 
type of corruption in one study. Furthermore, different models produce 
different results, some of which will be better than others at simulating 
or measuring corruption.
125
  To improve certainty of results within the 
various models, researchers need to examine corruption from a micro-
level.  The model must focus on a particular country, in a particular 
area (e.g. education), and examine a specific type of corruption (e.g. 
bribery).  The more focused a model is, the more reliable the results 
will be.  Any strategy or model attempting to measure corruption 
“should fit the particular circumstances of a country, taking into 
account the nature of the corruption problem as well as the 
                                                 
119 See John Hooker, Corruption from a Cross-cultural Perspective, 16 
EMERALD CROSS CULTURAL MGMT 251 (2009), available at 
www.emeraldinsight.com/1352-7606.htm. 
120 Khan, supra note 83, at 31. 
121 Hooker, supra note 119, at 252.  
122 See Frederik Balfour, You Say Guanxi, I Say Schmoozing, 
BUSINESSWEEK, Nov. 19, 2007, available at http://www.businessweek.com/ 
magazine/content/07_47/b4059066.htm.  
123 Jain, supra note 4, at 83. 
124 Zaman & Faiz-Ur-Rahim, supra note 60, at 119.  
125 Fine & Owen, supra note 70, at 927.  
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opportunities and constraints for addressing it.”
126
  The information 
collected by a specific model can then be combined with other specific 
models addressing corruption to develop theories on how to combat 
particular types of corruption within that country.  From these theories, 
lawmakers can use that information to develop laws to inhibit a 
particular type of corruption within the country.  
Assuming that corruption can be measured, there is still the issue 
of whether enough data can be found to accurately measure corruption. 
A person who commits corrupt acts will most likely never report those 
acts for corruption measurement purposes. So the question remains: if 
corrupt acts are done in secrecy, how can models properly measure 
corruption? 
B.  THE DATA ISSUE 
In modeling, once a problem has been identified the next step is 
data collection.
127
  However, finding precise data on the problem of 
corruption presents a unique challenge.  Corruption is difficult to 
measure because it is an illegal act that is done by the perpetrator in 
secrecy.  The ability to directly and regularly observe corrupt acts is 
nearly impossible to do.
128
  In order to have an accurate understanding 
of the problem and to provide the needed input for the model, a 
sufficient amount of data is needed.
129
  
Without complete information and data inherently flawed due to 
the secrecy of corruption, researchers cannot construct predictable 
corruption model simulations, but must instead resort to using sparse 
and uncertain data.  Limitations in data hinder modelers’ ability to 
determine whether a model is working or is accurate.
130
  Model 
simulations are ultimately affected by the accessibility and totality of 
the input data.
131
  The flaws and incompleteness in available corruption 
data further separate model results and the real world conditions.
132
  
Incomplete data therefore, unfortunately results in the causes and 
effects of a corrupt act within a particular country to be misdiagnosed.  
                                                 
126 Hung-En Sung, A Convergence Approach to the Analysis of Political 
Corruption: A Cross-National Study, 38 CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE 137, 156 
(2002). 
127 See HILLIER & LIEBERMAN, supra note 68. 
128 See Olken, supra note 6, at 1. 
129 HILLIER & LIEBERMAN, supra note 68, at 9.  
130 Fine & Owen, supra note 70, at 925. 
131 Id. at 924.  
132 Id. at 925. 
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Because of the data issues involved in identifying and assessing 
governmental corruption, some scholars criticize corruption models by 
claiming that “first-class modeling demands first-class data,” which 
corruption models may not have.
133
  However, in order for models to 
have an impact on society, first-class data may not actually be needed.  
Even the Reinikka and Svensson Bargaining Model, used to determine 
what could be done to prevent the siphoning of Ugandan school funds, 
had issues with data collection.
134
  Using PETS to track the flow of 
funds moving through the system presented a few challenges.  First, 
PETS was only a survey and therefore a person may have a strong 
incentive to misreport if that person was misusing funds.
135
  Unlike 
other areas of research where the acts of the agent maybe legal, it is 
illogical to believe that a person stealing funds or committing some 
other type of illegal act would ever admit to those acts in a volunteer 
survey.
136
  In addition to possible misreporting, the information given 
by the agent may have only partially captured what PETS intended 
measure.
137
  To deal with these data collection issues the investigators 
used a “multiangular data collection strategy,” collecting information 
from a number of different sources and identifying which respondents 
had incentives to misreport, focusing on data sources that were least 
likely to be contaminated by such incentives.
138
 
Although there were issues with data collection, the ultimate 
results from the Reinikka and Svensson model and the implementation 
of the conclusions drawn from that model had a tremendous impact on 
Ugandan school funding.  When collecting the data necessary for a 
model, much of the data may only be “rough estimates based only on 
educated guesses.”
139
  As shown in the Reinikka and Svensson model 
example, even when a team spends a considerable amount of time 
collecting data and trying to improve its accuracy, ultimately the team 
                                                 
133 Daniel A. Faber, Modeling Climate Change and Its Impacts: Law, 
Policy, and Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1654, 1660 (2007) citing M. Bruce Beck, 
How Best to Look Forward?, 316 SCI. 202, 202 (2007).  
134 See generally Reinikka & Svensson, supra note 91, at 6 n. 3. 
135 Id. at 7. 
136 See Seligson, supra note 44, at 383 (In other areas of development it is 
easy to have participants or outsiders list accomplishments. For example, health 
workers can report on the number of vaccines administered or healthy babies 
delivered. We cannot ask, however, for police officers to report on the number 
of bribes they take in a given week or for customs officials to report on how 
much duty goes uncollected). 
137 Reinkikka & Svensson, supra note 91, at 7.  
138 Id. at 8. 
139 HILLIER & LIEBERMAN, supra note 68, at 9. 
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will have to make do with the best data that it can obtain.
140
  Since all 
efforts to measure corruption using data will involve some level of 
uncertainty,
141
 the Reinikka and Svensson Bargaining Model illustrates 
that corruption models do not necessarily require precise data.  Rather, 
a successful corruption model can use somewhat unreliable data and 
still be effective. The better the data is for a model, the more accurate 
the conclusions are that can be drawn from that model.  The more 
accurate the conclusions that can be drawn from a model, the greater 
the impact the model can have on a country and its citizens.  
However, because every model is simply an approximation, the 
predictability of models will unavoidably contain some errors.
142
  As 
evinced with the Reinikka and Svensson Bargaining Model, however, 
the fact that a model may contain flawed data should not deter 
lawmakers from using models for anti-corruption purposes.  Corruption 
models can still have an impact on countries that use them properly.  
It would be a mistake to believe that corruption models could 
possibly ever be 100% accurate.  “Model predictions cannot be taken as 
gospel.”
143
  Even if a model is the best approximation of a particular 
real-world situation, the model’s results can never be an exact 
calculation due the human variables included in the model’s analysis.
144
  
Models are used simply because human behavior cannot be measured 
directly.
145
  A model’s inability to explain every aspect of human 
behavior or include all the necessary variables a human must consider 
does not make the model invalid.
146
  Models contribute to society by 
focusing attention on the major issues affecting society and by setting 
the boundaries on the likely outcomes.
147
  Based on the design and 
data, lawmakers have the choice to either accept a corruption model 
and its results as sufficient or to simply disregard the model as a tool to 
                                                 
140 Id.  
141 See Daniel Kaufmann et al., Measuring Corruption: Myths and 
Realities, DEV. OUTREACH, Sept. 2006, at 37.  
142 Fine & Owen, supra note 70, at 922.  
143 Farber, supra note 132, at 1658.  
144 See Fine & Owen, supra note 70, at 905 n.10 (citing M. GRANGER 
MORGAN & MAX HENRION, UNCERTAINTY: A GUIDE TO DEALING WITH 
UNCERTAINTY IN QUANTITATIVE RISK AND POLICY ANALYSIS 68 (1990)). 
145 John Veilleux, The Scientific Model in Law, 75 GEO. L.J. 1967, 1990 
(1987). 
146 Id. at 1989. 
147 John L. King & Kenneth L. Kraemer, Models, Facts, and the Policy 
Process: The Political Ecology of Estimated Truth 6 (CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON 
INFO. SYS. AND ORG., Working Paper #URB-006, 1993), available at  
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help combat corruption.  If lawmakers decide that models accurately 
measure what they purport to measure, governments must still take 
affirmative steps to implement policies based on the conclusions 
gathered from the models because models cannot have an impact on 
society on their own. 
 
IV.  THE LEGAL ACCEPTANCE OF MODELS 
A.  THE ISSUES WITH SOCIAL SCIENCE MODELS 
The relationship between law and socio-political models has 
slowly evolved over the years.
148
  Over the past five decades, models 
have become an important component of the policy-making process in 
the United States, especially as it relates to economic policies.
149
  In the 
United States, economic theories and models began to gain prominence 
in the 1970s.
150
  These models were the first tool to offer more than 
ideologies and guesswork; they offered actual numbers from the well-
established processes of analysis.
151
  Economic models have become so 
ingrained in the American policy-making process that they instrumental 
in most economic policy decisions.
152
 
The use of social science theories and data was arguably 
motivated by the case Brown v. Board of Education.
153
  In Brown, the 
attorneys for the plaintiffs introduced psychological data showing that 
the segregation of schoolchildren by race would make black children 
feel inferior and retard their educational development.
154
  The 
introduction of this study was essential in helping the United States 
Supreme Court recognize the need for legal equality among the races, 
and reverse years of racial inequality in the American legal system.
155
  
Although the Brown decision had a lasting impact on American society, 
commentators and United States lower courts have been hostile to the 
                                                 
148 See generally Robin Feldman, Historical Perspectives on Law & 
Science, 2009 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, (2009), http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/ 
feldman-historica-perspectives.pdf.  
149 See generally King * Kraemer, supra note 147, at 6. 
150 See generally Robin Feldman, Law’s Misguided Love Affair with 
Science, 10(1) MINN. J.L. SCI. &TECH. 95 (2009) [hereinafter Misguided Love 
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151 King & Kraemer, supra note 147, at 6. 
152 Id. at 6.  
153 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
154 Id. at  494  n.11.  
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use of social science theories to address legal issues.
156
  The reason for 
this hostility is most likely because of the complexity of social science 
models due to human decision-making variables.  In addition, most 
legal scholars simply lack the scientific training and expertise to fully 
grasp complex models based on human behavior and thus such models 
are looked at in a critical light.
157
 
Some scholars would argue that social science models, such as 
corruption models, should not be used for lawmaking purposes because 
of certain conflicts that exist between social science and law.  Some of 
these conflicts include: 
(1)  [S]ocial science is innovative, while law resists 
innovation, 
(2) [S]ocial science is based on data and observation, 
while law is based on precedent and hierarchy, 
(3) [S]ocial science seeks an objective answer to 
problems, while law seeks an adversarial victory, 
(4) [S]ocial science is descriptive, while law is 
prescriptive, 
(5) [S]ocial science is nomothetic, while law is 
idiographic, 
(6) [S]ocial science conclusions are probabilistic and 
tentative, while legal conclusions are irrevocable 
and must appear certain, 
(7) [S]ocial science is proactive, while law is reactive 
. . . .
158
 
Another argument against the use of models to influence the law 
is that these models cannot “fully capture and describe subjective 
human behavior.”
159
  Because humans are complex, intelligent beings; 
                                                 
156 Blumenthal, supra note 13, at 2-3 (citing John H. Wigmore, Professor 
Muensterberg and the Psychology of Testimony: Being a Report of the Case of 
Cokestone v. Muensterberg, 3 ILL. L. REV. 399 (1909), Craig Haney, 
Psychology and Legal Change: The Impact of a Decade, 17 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 376-78 (1993), J. Alexander Tanford, The Limits of a Scientific 
Jurisprudence: The Supreme Court and Psychology, 66 IND. L.J. 137, 144-50 
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157 Feldman, supra note 148, at 110-11.  
158 Blumenthal, supra note 13, at 70 (citing Haney, supra note 155, at 159-
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159 Veilleux, supra note 145, at 1989.   
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human behavior is often more than what is shown by a pattern of 
activity.
160
  For these reasons, models should be used to help inform the 
policy-making process and not used to become the policy itself.  The 
use of models in the legislative process simply gives researchers and 
policy-makers an idea of whether proposed laws and policies are likely 
to produce results within an acceptable range of the model.
161
  The use 
of modeling in this way can help reduce the number of policy proposals 




Politicians, lawmakers, and lawyers are not scientists or 
engineers; therefore, the complexity of corruption models is an obstacle 
that must be overcome in order for these types of models to be 
embraced in lawmaking.
163
  A process, such as modeling, based on 
complex technical examination makes public participation difficult.
164
  
A modeling expert, through dedicated studying, can comprehend the 
nuances of corruption models.  However, persons unfamiliar with such 
processes, such as a politician, cannot be reasonably expected to 
understand the inner workings of corruption models in order to 
critically assess and critique the model.
165
  Because corruption models 
are complex, lack of understanding by legislators and other lawmakers 
may cause some modeling issues to be overlooked and thus never 
explored.  Unless the politician receives a coherent explanation, in lay 
terms, of the model and its complexities, he will only have the choice 
of accepting or rejecting the results of the model.
166
  Hence, lawmakers 
need to appoint regulators who have a sufficient background to 
effectively explain models and their results to those who will ultimately 
draft and- create laws that will impact the country.  
B.  AN EXAMPLE OF THE LEGAL ACCEPTANCE OF MODELS: TANZANIA 
AND THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT-CLIENT MODEL 
Tanzania’s struggle with corruption and its use of models to 
combat corruption is a prime example of the issues that country goes 
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through when using models to combat corruption.
167
  Tanzania, like 
many other African countries, has been dealing with corruption for 
years.  In 1996, to address the corruption issues plaguing the country, 
President Benjamin Mkapa set up a commission to investigate the 
causes of the corruption in the country.
168
  The commission results 
showed that corruption permeated throughout all parts of the 




To help assist in curbing corruption, the Tanzanian Government 
used the principal-agent-client model [hereinafter PAC model].  The 
PAC model primarily provides,  
corruption occurs when an agent betrays the 
principal’s interest in pursuit of his own by accepting 
or seeking a benefit from the service seeker, the 
client (C)” person seeking services (the client). The 
conditions for corruption present themselves when 
the principal (P) is in a powerful position and the 
agent (A), whom P has entrusted to carry out 
services, has an element of discretion in 
                                                 
167 See Indira Carr, Corruption, the Southern African Development 
Community Anti-corruption Protocol and the principal-agent-client Model, 5 
INT’L J.L. CONTEXT  147, 147–177 (2009).  
168 Id. at 165.  
169 Id. According to the Warioba Commission Report, the commission 
recommended:  
(1) cleaning up existing leadership and developing ethical standards for 
future leaders; 
(2) clear demarcation of responsibilities between the executive officer of 
ministries, departments and parastatals and ministers and members of 
boards of directors in order to enable accountability;  
(3) vetting officers employed in sensitive areas such as home affairs,  
(4) employment based on merit;  
(5) declaration of assets and gifts received by leaders and public 
officials;  
(6) severe punishment in the form of nationalisation and forfeiture of 
property of ‘big givers of bribes’ (i.e. persons involved in grand 
corruption);  
(7) adopting programmes that raise awareness in the public of their 
rights; and  
(8) a role for the media in exposing corruption and in educating the 
public. 
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The Tanzanian government itself was the principal, members of 
the government were the agents, and the clients were Tanzanian 
citizens.  Under the PAC model, three areas of improvement were 
found necessary in order to combat corruption issues within a country:  
(1) reduce the monopolistic power; (2) create an environment that 
allows citizens to confidently exercise discretion; and (3) improve 
accountability and transparency.
171
  Based on the PAC model, Tanzania 
undertook a variety of actions and implemented a series of new laws.
172
  
Among such actions and policies, the Tanzanian government 
implemented:  
(1)  [A] rule of law and legal framework ‘intended to 
facilitate sectoral laws review and create 
conditions necessary for the restoration of 
confidence in the judiciary and law enforcement 
agencies’;  
(2)  Financial discipline and management in order to 
‘reduce and eradicate siphoning of public finds 
by unfaithful officials and increase revenue 
collection’;  
(3)  Transparency in procurement administration and 
procedures; 
(4)  Education of public to harmful effects of 
corruption on the economy and social values and 
creation of awareness of rights;  
(5)  Public service reform that recognizes [sic] the 
accountability of public officers and fair 
remuneration package for their services;  
(6)  Protection of informers in order ‘to encourage 
citizens to co-operate;’ and  
(7)  Support of the media so that they can report the 
‘corrupt elements without fear or favour [sic] and 
                                                 
170 Id. at 151 n. 23 (citing ROBERT E. KLITGAARD, CONTROLLING 
CORRUPTION (1988)). 
171 Id. at 152.  
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to publicise [sic] the harm they do to the 
innocent, the poor and the weak in Tanzania.
173
 
The Tanzanian government implemented this seven-step strategy with 
the hope that these efforts would successfully reduce corruption within 
Tanzania. 
Thus far, the changes that the Tanzanian government 
implemented have received mixed results. While there has been a large 
number of corruption cases reported, very few of those cases were 
actually prosecuted.
174
  According to the Afro Barometer survey, there 
seems to be a decrease in petty corruption overall, but perception of 
grand corruption among top level officials remains high.
175
  Despite 
numerous efforts by the government to fight corruption in Tanzania, 
Transparency Index’s Corruption Perception Index still lists Tanzania 
as highly corrupt without any significant improvement in its corruption 
perception score over the past five years.
176
  As previously discussed, 
this may be due to the belief that once a corruption perception index 
publishes a country as highly corrupt, that perception does not change 
because future survey respondents tend to overestimate the corruption 
within that particular country based on its past reputation.
177
  
As with any major change or implementation of new laws focused 
on ridding a country of a problem that has plagued it for years, results 
will not be immediate.  The real impact of newly adopted laws takes 
time to become apparent because the government has to do away with 
years of accepted practices.  For example, Brown v. Board of 
Education
178
 was decided in 1954 but the desegregation of schools did 
not really start until the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
179
 and 
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.
180
  It took an 
additional fifteen years after the passage of the federal statutes for the 
United States Supreme Court to be satisfied with the progress of school 
                                                 
173 Id. at 165-66 (“The seven priority areas of strategy”). 
174 Id. at 167 (In 2005, the number of corruption cases being reported are 
in the thousands (8586) yet only around 200 cases were formally opened and 
less than twenty actually went to trial.).   
175 Id. at 168. 
176 Id. at 167.  
177 See Dreher, supra note 2, at 444, n. 5. 
178 Brown, 347 U.S. 483.  
179 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h-6 (2006 & Supp. 2009). 
180 Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-10, 79 
Stat. 27(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-7941 (2006 & Supp. 2009). 
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  Policy-makers should not view the use of corruption 
models as a tool that will bring an immediate end to corruption.  If a 
government truly desires change, then the time it takes for progress 
should not discourage them from embracing and experimenting with 
models and other new technologies that could possibly be useful in the 
fight against corruption.  
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
As corruption continues to be problematic around the world, 
governments and scholars will continue to search for ways to 
effectively combat its causes.  The effects of corruption are widespread:  
“it misallocates resources, reduces economic surplus and consequently 
economic growth, and degrades . . . the link between effort and 
reward.”
182
  All of these negative effects of corruption ultimately affect 
the public’s confidence in the effectiveness of the government.  
Perception-based indices are not enough to inform policy-makers 
as to effective anti-corruption policies.  The negative consequences of 
complete reliance on perception-based corruption indices, should 
encourage policy-makers and legislators to take additional steps to 
measure the causes and effects of corruption.  Use of corruption models 
are most certainly a step in the right direction towards making a 
significant dent in the problem of corruption affecting countries 
worldwide.  
Since this article covered a variety of issues dealing with 
corruption models, it may be helpful to identify some key take away 
points for any government or organization that may want to use 
corruption models to curb corruption. 
1.  Models can and should be used to measure the causes and 
effects of corruption.  These models may be useful in assisting efforts 
to prevent corruption.
183
  These models also establish and identify the 
relationships between the causes and effects of corruption.  Such 
relationships can ultimately be used to make predictions on corrupt 
behavior and the influences of corrupt behavior. 
                                                 
181 Just prior to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 1.2% of Black 
schoolchildren were attending school with whites.  The integration rate rose to 
32% in 1968 and to 91.3% in 1972. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW 
TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL 
EQUALITY 380 n.77 (2004).  
182 Khan, supra note 83, at 32.  
183 Judge, supra note 6, at 93.  
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2. Corruption models should not be looked upon as gospel.  
Models provide a glimpse of what might be and not of what will be.
184
  
There is a considerable amount of uncertainty in corruption models due 
to the complexity of the human decision-making process and the lack 
of data available to measure corrupt acts.
185
  Thus, corruption models 
should not be looked upon to make policies but rather help develop 
policies based on its findings and other information available.  Model 
results can help decision-makers predict the outcome of a given policy 
or law and therefore such results should be used to develop parameters 
on what proposed laws should cover and touch upon.  
3.  Because corruption is complex and comes in many different 
forms, in order to increase the efficiency of models measuring 
corruption, the models should target (1) a specific type of corruption, 
(2) in a specific country, (3) take a country’s culture and norms into 
account, and if possible (4) focus on a particular area of government 
(i.e., education).  
4. Ultimately, due to the intentionally secretive nature of corrupt 
acts, any data collected on a particular corrupt act will be incomplete 
and possibly flawed.  Therefore, any model used by a government for 
corruption purposes should use a multi-angular data collection strategy. 
In other words, data and information should be collected from as many 
different sources and ways as feasibly possible.  A multi-angular data 
collection strategy will not solve all data issues but it can increase the 
reliability of the available data.  
5. Because politicians and lawmakers typically do not have 
scientific or mathematical backgrounds, any government agency that 
attempts to use models must educate and explain to lawmakers, in lay 
terms, what the model is attempting to measure, how it makes its 
measurements, and what the results of the model findings are based on. 
Clearer discussions of the modeling process and improved resources for 
understanding models could help make model-based planning more 
inclusive and easier for lawmakers to decide on whether to accept or 
reject the model results.
186
 
We hope that this discussion opens up further research into the 
impact that models can have on shaping anti-corruption laws.  While 
neither science nor law is perfect and both contain some conflicting 
                                                 
184 King & Kraemer, supra note 147, at 6.    
185 Fine & Owen, supra note 70, at 922. 
186 Id. at 979.  
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theories, corruption models can make an impact on corruption when the 
model results are used for the purposes of drafting policies and laws. 
While the belief that corruption can be completely eradicated is 
illogical, the reduction of systemic corruption within governments 
should be both a feasible and overall desirable objective.  Hopefully, as 
model accuracy improves, governments and other organizations can use 
corruption models as an additional means to reduce corruption within 
their countries. As discussed in this paper, the use of corruption models 
can be an alternative method to address the prevalence of corruption in 
foreign countries. Although corruption models have some flaws, if 
there is a sufficient amount of data available, anti-corruption models 
can inform policy-makers as to the causes and effects of corruption.  
The models can also point to ways in which governments can 
implement policies and laws to eradicate corruption throughout the 
system.  
